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INTRODUCTION 
Botswana's current economic objectives centre on diversification away from its 
historical dependence on diamonds and government. The primary aim is to 
ensure economic growth into the future as mineral sector growth slows down. 
The growth of incomes would address problems of unemployment and poverty 
through employment creation. Beyond these objectives, diversification will 
change the structure of the economy and therefore the nature of economic 
activity. It also has important implications for the ability of government to raise 
revenue through taxation and therefore for its ability to finance its expenditure. 
This brief paper explores the likely impact of diversification on government's 
revenue raising ability and hence on the magnitude of its overall role in the 
economy. It uses projections over a 20 year period to simulate possible 
scenarios for taxation and the size of government. The key point is that any 
diversification will cause government revenues to fall, in relative terms. The 
diamond sector is extremely profitable, and those profits are taxed at a very 
high rate; as the economy diversifies, other sectors will emerge that will be less 
profitable and less highly taxed. The projections in this paper show that under a 
varietyof ^lifferent-flssiimptions-about sectoral growth rates, and taxation and 
spending, government will have to significantly reduce its role in the economy. 
The base case scenario indicates that revenues will drop from around 40% of 
GDP at present to 30% over a 20 year period. Such a change will have major 
implications for choices to be made about the allocation of public expenditure. 
DIVERSIFICATION AND SECTORAL GROWTH RATES 
As is well known, Botswana's mining sector has grown rapidly over the past 25 
years, and has driven growth in the wider economy. Mineral revenues, 
primarily derived from diamonds, have provided the major share of 
government revenues, and these have been used to finance investment in 
physical and human capital, as well as the general expansion of government 
itself. Therefore, the development model that has served Botswana in the past 
has primarily involved the channelling of mineral revenues through 
government and into a range of public and private sector activities within 
Botswana. Government revenues and spending have grown extremely fast, and 
a substantial proportion of private sector activity - especially in sectors such as 
construction - has been heavily dependent upon public expenditure. 
However it has long been recognised that this mineral-led growth cannot 
continue indefinitely, and that much slower growth rates are likely in the future 
- if indeed there is any growth at all in the minerals sector once the current 
expansion of the Orapa diamond mine is completed. The objective of 
diversification therefore requires the generation of new " engines of growth" in 
the economy. Given the small size of Botswana's domestic economy it is 
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recognised that such diversification will have to be export-led. Thus a central 
role will have to be played by producers of exportable (tradeable) goods and 
services, primarily manufactured goods and tradeable services such as tourism. 
The success of this strategy is dependent upon the ability of firms in Botswana 
to penetrate export markets both regionally and internationally; for export 
growth to be capable of leading the economy requires Botswana firms to be 
efficient and internationally competitive, and also for present and potential 
export markets themselves to be growing. 
Diversification therefore involves increasing the share of non-mining private 
sector activities in the economy, and consequently a reduction in the share of 
mining and government in economy. This process should take place as the 
growth rates of manufacturing and other exporting sectors come to exceed the 
growth rates of minerals and government; it does not of course require that the 
mineral sector declines in size in absolute terms, only relative to other sectors. 
Botswana's present economic structure is that mining accounts for 
approximately 35% of GDP, government for 15%, and the non-mining private 
sector for about 50%. If diversification is successful, the non-mining private 
sector will grow to account for more than its current one half share. 
The reason that this is important for the present study - besides its implications 
for the structure of economic activity, employment and exports - is that the 
m i n i . n ^ s e c t o r (°J a t l e a s t t h e diamond mining component of the sector) is 
exceptionally profitable by normal economic standards. Because of this, and the 
nature of the agreements negotiated between the government and De Beers, the 
revenues raised by the government from mining, through taxes, royalties and 
dividends, account for a very high proportion of the mineral sector's output, 
(value added). Over the past decade, mineral revenues have accounted for 
around 50% of total government revenues, much higher than its share of GDP. 
As diversification takes place and the share of mining in the economy falls, 
mineral revenues will account for a smaller proportion of total government 
revenues. 
The activities that will grow to replace diamonds as diversification takes place 
are likely to earn more "normal" rates of profit1. This is mainly because of the 
control exerted over the marketing of rough diamonds internationally by a 
dominant firm - De Beers - whose monopolistic practices work to Botswana's 
benefit, as a producer.- By contrast, most other activities are far more 
competitive both domestically and internationally. Profits account for a lower 
proportion of value added in these sectors, and furthermore the tax rate applied 
to profits in general is much lower than that applied to mining profits2. As a 
1 "Normal" in the economic sense, where profits include the cost of capital but no monopoly 
or "excess profit" element. 
2 In addition, it may well be necessary to offer tax concessions (lower tax rates or tax holidays) 
to attract new inward investment. 
structural umnge and uouernntent Spending 3 
result, government's capacity to raise revenue from these sectors is much lower 
than its capacity to raise revenues from diamond mining. Even if the non-
mining sector partially replaces mining in the economy, government's capacity 
to raise revenue will fall relative to the size of the economy - in other words 
government revenues as a share of GDP will decline. 
PROJECTIONS 
In this section detailed projections are presented of sectoral growth, output, and 
taxation over a 20 year period. The base year is 1997/98 (the most recent year 
for which national accounts data are available), supplemented by information 
about government revenue and spending in 1998/99 and 1999/2000 from the 
1999 Financial Statements and Tables, published by MFDP at the time of the 
1999 Budget Speech. 
The base year calculations are actually derived from averages over a five year 
period from 1993/94 to 1997/98 (in order to minimise the impact of year to year 
fluctuations). Table 1 below shows these 5 year averages for sectoral shares of 
GDP, tax revenues as a percentage of sectoral GDP, and sectoral contributions 
to total tax revenue. (The full data for individual years used to derive these 
averages is shown in Table A1 in the appendix). 
Table 1: Summary of Sectoral GDP and Tax Revenues, 1993/94 to 1997/98 
.SL-iV,... . share of GDP tax revenue as % of 
sectoral GDP 
% of total tax revenue 
Mining 35.5% 57.3% 49.6% 
Private sector 49.5% 28.0% 33.5% 
Government 14.9% n/a 16.9% 
Total 100.0% 41.3% 100.0% 
As the table above shows, the effective tax rate on the mineral sector (57.3% of 
value added) is approximately twice that on the non-mineral private sector 
(28%). Because of this, minerals contribute approximately 50% of total revenues, 
compared to 33% for the non-mining private sector - an almost exact reversal of 
their contributions to GDP. 
The table shows that at present the government generates some revenue itself, 
and is not entirely dependent upon the rest of the economy for income. This 
represents revenue from the Bank of Botswana, derived from earnings on the 
government's assets at the Bank, which are in turn the result of accumulated 
budget surpluses over the past 16 years. 
Using these five-year averages as base data, we can make projections of the 
revenues derived from the mining and non-mining private sectors over a 20 
year period. These projections obviously depend upon the economic growth 
rates of each sector, which can only be "guesstimates". Therefore, we have 
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presented results for a variety of scenarios with different sectoral growth rates. 
Howev er, not only do the results depend upon the growth rates of the mining 
and non-mining private sectors, they also depend upon the growth rate of 
government. Ultimately, the growth of government is dependent upon its 
ability to raise revenues from the rest of the economy (notwithstanding its 
present ability to generate some revenues itself); if it tries to grow at a faster 
rate, its existing savings will eventually run down and it will accumulate debt. 
Future growth rates are highly uncertain. We therefore use a "base case" 
derived from NDP 8 and other information available at present, before 
examining the sensitivity of the outcomes of the base case to differing 
assumptions. The base case assumptions are as follows: 
Minerals: an increase in output of 15% in 1999/2000, resulting from the Orapa 
2000 expansion (which will double Orapa output in terms of carats). Thereafter, 
the minerals sector does not grow at all. 
Non-mining private sector: output increases at 6% a year. 
Tax rates: effective tax rates remain unchanged at the 1993-1998 averages given 
above. This means that tax revenues generated by each sector grow at the same 
rate as output. No allowance is made for lower effective tax rates on minerals 
due to the imposition of sales quotas that reduce sales below output, and which 
would therefore reduce the effective mineral sector tax rate (nor of any 
subsequent sale of stockpiled diamonds, which would raise the effective tax 
rate. Furthermore no account is taken of the likely declining profitability of 
diamond mining, as mining costs rise, which would also imply a declining 
mineral tax rate. Nor is any account taken of any possible further lowering of 
non-mineral tax rates. 
Government: revenues raised directly from the Bank of Botswana are 
calculated at 5% of the value of government deposits (this is the assumed long 
term real rate of return on the reserves). Government spending grows at 3% in 
1999/2000 (as per 1999 budget figures), and thereafter at 2% a year 
(approximately constant in real per capita terms). 
Other: all calculations are in real terms. 
Base Case Scenario Results (Scenario 1) 
The base case scenario results are summarised in Table 2 below (and shown in 
full in Appendix Table A2). This shows that government spending will fall from 
the current 42% of GDP to 32% of GDP after 20 years. However, because 
government spending grows relatively slowly (2% a year), the situation is 
sustainable. After initially running a budget deficit, the government eventually 
returns to a budget surplus in year 16 (2013). All budget deficits can be financed 
from the reserves. The reserves fall from current levels, but are not depleted; 
hence earnings from the reserves continue to provide a significant proportion of 
overall tax revenues. 
c 
E in 5 o a ~ !• re l-c o 
u O m 2 | 1 I 2 C. O 
n c -3 I' 
S s 5T, C T3 3 o CJ C — — a. 
2 C. 'J 5. 3 cr T) on 
™ o 
01 <u 
a 5 S .2 o 
m a. re o; 
1 1 I 2 a. O 
re a; a) re 
c > 2 £L 6 
lO ifi 
O — • 
0) 
o i S .9 , 
c -a d ^ 
s 5 a> a. 3 
QI CO CO 
1 I I 2 £L O 
7 (M M ^ id o n ^ n i o ui n ^ N 
ai 
o> • 3 .£ ^ Q. = -O = Q 
- 9-C3 0) Q. 3 ce oo w 
1 3 to 0) 
1 | I 2 £ CD 2 a. O 
co <N o> „ t» n n j ; r- r- O) fO n o N io 
0) O) 
re 
E 
E 
3 CO 
a> 01 
— C <D 
1 | I 2 a o 
in a. 
2 Q ro O 
2 0. 
n t o CM CO Ol 
" UO CO 
3 .£ </i n c -o 3 it a) c q. Q 
Structural Change atui Government Spending 5 
The reason that this scenario is sustainable is that government spending grows 
at a lower rate than the overall economy, and remains within the constraints of 
the lower growth rate of revenues imposed by the structural economic shift. 
Scenario 2: Higher growth of government spending 
The above scenario shows one way that a sustainable government budget 
position can be achieved even with declining (in relative terms) mineral 
revenues (although of course it would require some hard decisions to be made 
about spending priorities, given the fall in government spending in relation to 
GDP, and does not allow any real increase, on a per capita basis, in government 
spending). However, the fragility of this sustainable position is shown by 
scenario 2, which is the same as the base case scenario except that government 
spending grows at 3% a year from 1999 onwards, rather than 2%. This 
apparently small change completely transforms the budget position. The 
budget deficit grows to over 6% of GDP, and the reserves are depleted by year 
16 (2016) (see table 2 above and appendix table A3). In order to finance the 
deficit, government must borrow, and hence the revenues that it generates itself 
become negative as it has to pay interest on its debt. In the long term, 
government revenue (net of interest payments) is lower, at 28% of GDP, than in 
the base case scenario. 
Scenarios 3 and 4: Slower economic growth 
The above two scenarios both assume a relatively high rate of growth for the 
non-mining private sector. However, this is by no means assured; given that 
this will have to be mainly driven by exports (as two of the previous drivers of 
the private sector - mining and government - will no longer be growing fast), 
much depends on the growth of regional and international markets. With the 
current economic stagnation in South Africa (the main market for Botswana's 
manufactured exports) and the southern African region more generally, this 
may be optimistic. Botswana has managed to increase its exports to South 
Africa in recent years, despite the very slow growth of the South African 
economy, by increasing its market share; this has been possible because 
Botswana's economy is so small relative to that of South Africa, but export 
growth based on increasing market share cannot be assumed to be possible 
indefinitely. Scenario 3 assumes that the private sector grows at 6% in 1998, 4% 
in 1999, and 3% a year thereafter (see table 2 and appendix table A4). 
Government spending grows, as in the base case scenario, at 2% a year from 
1999 onwards. 
This scenario gives an outcome that is even worse than scenario 2. With the 
slow growth of the private sector, and hence in total tax revenues, a 
government growth rate of 2% becomes unsustainable. Government savings are 
depleted by year 15 (2012), and the government budget deficit reaches 12% of 
GDP by year 20 (2017). Government revenue (net of interest) declines to 29% of 
GDP. 
In order for the government budget to become sustainable with slower private 
sector growth, the growth rate of public spending must be cut from 2% to 1% a 
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year (Scenario 4, see tables 2 and A5). Although the government does exhaust 
its reserves, the deficit is contained at a manageable level. 
Scenario 5: Higher mineral growth 
The assumption of no mineral growth after the Orapa expansion may be 
considered to be unduly restrictive. Even though no major new mineral 
discoveries have been announced in recent years, there is extensive exploration 
and prospecting, which might well lead to further exploitable mineral deposits 
in due course. Scenario 5 (tables 2 and A6) therefore includes modest mineral 
growth, at 4% a year, from 2000-2017. While this permits a somewhat higher 
rate of government spending growth, it does not remove the need for a major 
reduction in the share of GDP accounted for by government spending. A 5% 
growth rate of government spending still leads to an unsustainable budget 
deficit, and revenue falls to 31% of GDP. Even this may be optimistic, as it is 
unlikely that the present mineral tax rate (which mainly derives from 
diamonds) can be applied to other mineral activities. But even if there is modest 
mineral growth, it does not change the basic conclusions. 
Chart 1 shows the different paths of budget deficit projections under the five 
scenarios. This shows that the sustainable scenarios are 1 and 4; the others 
involve budget deficits that are too high, or unstable, or both. 
Implications 
The above analysis has a number of implications for public finance policy. First, 
government spending will have to increase at much slower rates than in the 
past. Over the last 15 years, real spending has increased at an average annual 
rate of nearly 10%. This kind of growth rate is obviously unsustainable into the 
future. Second, whether or not the government budget is sustainable is highly 
sensitive to relatively small changes in the growth rate of government spending 
- what appears to be a small difference in spending growth rates can lead, when 
compounded over a long period of time, to very different outcomes. 
However, a sustainable level of government spending in relation to GDP is not 
necessarily unachievable. Although the proportion of GDP accounted for by 
government spending is at present relatively high (over 40%), it has been much 
lower in the recent past: in 1994/95, for instance, the ratio was only 34%, and 
this had been reduced from 43% in 1991/92. However, what is needed though 
is a change in the underlying trend of government spending; over the past 15 
years the trend has been for government spending to increase as a percentage of 
GDP (see chart 2). From now on, it is clear that the long term trend will have to 
be downwards. In considering whether this can be achieved, it is important to 
recall that the almost total colonial neglect of Botswana required a prolonged 
period of high government spending to catch up, but that this catch up period is 
now over. Second, a period of more than 30 years of high rates of increase of 
government spending, with no financial constraint, must mean that there is 
considerable scope for increasing efficiency - increasing the real output of 
government services without increasing their cost - through initiatives such as 
privatisation and reform of government departments and ministries. 
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Finally, the need to reduce government spending in relative terms will give rise 
to the need for some hard decisions over the allocation of spending. In the 
future there will be a need for increases in health spending (due to AIDS), 
welfare spending (AIDS orphans etc.), and education (to address skills 
shortages). Other areas of spending will need to be cut if these increases are to 
be financed. 
T a b l e A 1 : S o u r c e Da ta 
1 A. S e c t o r a l G D P ( c u r r e n t p r i c e s ) 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/95 1996/97 1997/98 
3922 4075 4846 6469 7682" 
5344 6297 7239 8543 9777 
1707 1880 2117 2490 2970 
10972 12252 14202 17503 20428 
Source: MFDP Annual Economic Report. 1999 
I B . S h a r e s o f G D P 
°± 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 A v e r a g e 
M i n i n 9 35.7% 33.3% 34.1% 37.0% 37.6% 3 5 . 5 % 
Private 48.7% 51.4% 51.0% 48.8% 47.9% 4 9 . 5 % 
Government 15.6% 15.3% 14.9% 14.2% 14.5% 1 4 . 9 % 
Source: MFDP Annual Economic Report, 1999 
I C . Tax R e v e n u e s 
Pm 
Mining 
Private 
Govt. 
Total 
Pm 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
Mineral 2279 2349 2591 3640 4681 
Private 1974 1672 1822 2054 2653 
BOB profits 1107 451 1051 1700 947 
Total 5359 4473 5464 7395 8281 
Source: MFDP Financial Statements and Tables, 1999 
1D. Tax R e v e n u e s 
as % of sector GDP 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97- 1997/98 A v e r a g e 
Mineral 58% 58% 53% 56% 61% 5 7 . 3 % 
Private 37% 27% 25% 24% 27% 2 8 . 0 % 
Govt. 65% 24% 50% 68% 32% n/a 
Total 49% 37% 38% 42% 41% 4 1 . 3 % 
1E. Tax R e v e n u e s 
% of total revenues 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 A v e r a g e 
Mineral 43% 53% 47% 49% 57% 4 9 . 6 % 
Private 37% 37% 33% 28% 32% 3 3 . 5 % 
Govt. 21% 10% 19% 23% 11% 1 6 . 9 % 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 0 0 . 0 % 
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